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Abstract as Tunisia continues to move forward on the path of democratisation and 
pluralism, the problems it may still face remain significant. a comparative analysis of the 
(failed) algerian attempt to democratise and the current process underway in Tunisia 
could shed light on what Tunisia needs to do to avoid a setback in its democratisation 
process.
Keywords Tunisia | algeria | arab Spring | Democratisation | Terrorism | State
Introduction
Tunisia is, in every way, the front-runner among the arab Spring countries and the only 
country in which the arab Spring has produced a real, democratic transformation. The 
country has moved from having an autocratic government to a more plural and open 
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system, in which elections are free and fair, and losers accept the results without con-
testing the legitimacy of the overall system. Despite these positive developments, Tuni-
sia is now facing a number of old and new problems, from regional dualism to terrorism, 
and from the spread of radicalism to economic problems. These issues may undermine 
its path towards democratic and pluralistic consolidation. To understand what Tunisia 
must avoid to save its democratic achievements, it is worth looking at the experience 
of another country in the Maghreb region, where the opening up of the political system 
turned into a bloody civil war which has prevented the country from consolidating its 
democratic and pluralistic opening: algeria.
algeria and Tunisia are two very different countries in terms of demographic size, 
political and social systems, geopolitical orientations, colonial histories and economic 
structures. nevertheless, analysing them comparatively can provide insights into how to 
safeguard the process of democratisation and move forward in pluralising the political 
and social system. it is also worth noting that in terms of democratisation and pluralism, 
Tunisia is currently more advanced in every way than algeria was at the end of the 
1980s. Still, algeria’s experience is a powerful reminder of the potential for crisis that 
democratic setbacks may embody.
Moreover, algeria was the first Maghrebi country to experience the emergence of an 
internal terrorist threat as a result of the halted democratic process. This represented a 
systemic menace to its political and social system. as such, analysing its tortuous path 
to ending terrorism and the civil war, returning to normality and strengthening civilian 
rule over the military, and how it missed the chance to promote a deeper and more 
consistent democratic system after the riots of october 1988 and the first multi-party 
elections in its history, is helpful in analysing the challenges Tunisia is facing today. in 
particular, such an analysis can highlight what Tunisia must avoid and what it should 
take from that experience to strengthen the consolidation of its path towards pluralism 
and democracy.
The Algerian experience
when discussing the arab Spring, many scholars have observed that algeria remained 
immune from this wave of protests, despite the presence of a socio-economic situa-
tion that could be considered prone to triggering revolution. However, revolution did not 
happen for two main reasons: divisions between the various opposition groups in the 
country and the political use of economic tools to reward loyalty and reduce discon-
tent (Cristiani 2011). However, it is also worth noting another critical factor that pre-
vented algeria from experiencing the arab Spring: the country had already experienced 
something similar in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the political instability of that 
period triggered the eruption of the civil war, memories of which are still vivid in the 
political psychology of the country today. This was an influential factor that prevented 
algeria from experiencing a new wave of destabilisation (addi 2011). nevertheless, that 
experience offers a number of potential lessons for Tunisia, and more for all countries 
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which are undergoing a process of pluralistic opening up and changes in their political 
structures.
at the end of the 1980s, algeria experienced the first serious domestic political crisis in 
its post-independency era. The crisis placed significant pressure on the socialist rentier 
state built in the aftermath of independence by ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumedi-
enne1 and which centred around oil, the national Liberation Front (Front de libération 
nationale, FLn) and the military. a decade of declining oil prices put this socialist–dirigist 
economic model under pressure and contributed to the progressive erosion of the legiti-
macy of the FLn. This dynamic was also accompanied by the rise of conservative, hard-
line nationalists, who had grown stronger after quelling the Berber Spring in the early 
1980s, and islamist organisations, which were re-emerging after the marginalisation they 
had suffered prior to the 1980s (Le Sueur 2010, 30). The october riots in 1988 signalled 
the beginning of a new phase. The FLn’s decision to resort to using the military to quell 
the revolts contributed to the end of the little legitimacy that it still enjoyed in the eyes of 
the algerian citizens. This paved the way for the end of the FLn’s hegemony in the politi-
cal system. president Chadli Benjedid introduced a number of ground-breaking 
changes to the political system, terminating the identification of the state with the party. 
He also abandoned reference to the ‘revolutionary socialist option’, opening up the politi-
cal system to multi-party politics2 through elections which were won by the islamist 
islamic Salvation Front (Front islamique du Salut, FiS) (aghrout 2008, 32).
The FiS’s political discourse was characterised by a number of controversies and 
ambiguities, particularly among those sections of the party closer to ali Belhadj.3 never-
theless, the FiS’s stance in the window of pluralist opportunity that opened up following 
Benjedid’s changes was not anti-democratic and accepted de facto the rules of the 
democratic game and political pluralism, despite the military’s attempts to provoke the 
FiS to make it appear undemocratic—a plot later known as the ‘nezzar plan’.4
while it is now impossible to know whether, once in power, the FiS would have halted 
the democratic process, what we do know is that the support for them in first the local 
and then the national elections prompted a response from the military, who suspended 
the democratic process, a decision that the FiS condemned but that did not prompt any 
calls to arms.
1 ahmed Ben Bella was the first president of independent algeria, deposed in a coup d’état by Houari Bou-
medienne in 1965. The latter would rule algeria until his death in 1978.
2 after winning local elections with a comfortable margin, and despite the attempts of the algerian authori-
ties to co-opt and contain its members, the FiS gained 47.3 % of the vote, worth 231 out of 430 seats in 
the first round of the national elections of 26 December 1991, with the FLn winning less than half of the 
FiS votes (23.4 %). as other, smaller islamist parties won around 8.5 % of the vote, more than 50 % of the 
votes cast were for islamist groups, which shows how widespread opposition was to the FLn.
3 ali Belhadj co-founded the FiS with abassi Madani, and he was the most important figure among the radi-
cal/revolutionary group within the party.
4 The plan was named after General Khaled nezzar, who revealed its existence in his Mémoires [Memoirs] 
(Le Sueur 2010, 48–50).
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in the following years, a number of developments radically changed the overall pic-
ture: the FiS’s status as a legal political party was revoked by the algerian authori-
ties; its leadership—particularly the old guard that represented a buffer against radical 
groups—disbanded; and the party split into many smaller groups, including militant 
branches that grew increasingly strong and independent (Heristchi 2004, 117–18).
ultimately, the military repression carried out by the algerian state and the halting of 
the democratic process, combined with a number of international factors—for instance, 
the western acquiescence towards the end of the algerian democratic process and the 
Gulf war in 1991, which radicalised further islamist groups around the world (Cavatorta 
2009)—paved the way for the eruption of the algerian civil war and the dominance of the 
military, particularly the Department of intelligence and Security (Département du ren-
seignement et de la Sécurité, DrS).5 The first years of the civil war were the most vio-
lent, with the army adopting an eradication stance, aimed at wiping out radical islamist 
groups. as the civil war deepened, the political approaches to how to handle this threat 
became less unified, signalled by the emergence of a dialectic between the so-called 
éradicateurs (eradicators) and dialoguistes (dialoguers), the two sides in an unending 
political debate that would characterise algerian politics in the years to follow. The dia-
loguistes would later get the upper hand, particularly once abdelaziz Bouteflika rose to 
power. president Bouteflika promoted a policy of reconciliation with different parts of the 
algerian islamist world (Le Sueur 2010, 90–5). He also brought the military back under 
civilian control, through a policy that experienced significant resistance within algeria but 
culminated in the disbanding of the DrS in 2016 (nield 2016). However, Bouteflika failed 
to promote real democratisation in algeria.
The Arab Spring and Tunisia: a new beginning
Tunisia was the birthplace of the arab Spring6 and, as noted at the start of this article, is 
also the sole successful story of the wave of revolutionary change that was too quickly 
named, and as it is still known by some, the ‘fourth wave of democratisation’ (abushouk 
2016; Howard and Hussain 2013; Grand 2011). This revolutionary wave affected almost 
all the countries of the Middle East and north africa but the outcomes have been very 
diverse, even among those countries that have experienced an actual regime change 
(anderson 2011).
Despite these achievements, the Tunisian democratic transition and the path towards 
consolidation remain fragile (Murphy 2016, 239). Breakdowns and potential reverse 
5 as algeria fell into civil war, the DrS became one of the most important players in the algerian political 
landscape. it was run by Mohamed Mediène, also known as ‘Toufik’, from 1990 to 2015, and for many years 
represented the real decision-making authority in algeria.
6 on 17 December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a street fruit seller who was also a young university graduate 
unable to find another job, set himself on fire to protest about police harassment and unemployment in Sidi 
Bouzid. This extreme act of protest, which led to his death, unleashed riots that later spread across Tunisia, 
reaching Tunis and triggering a mass protest movement which forced president Ben ali to step down.
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waves continue to represent a threat. The country’s structural economic and regional 
dualism (Bousnina 2012), one of the key triggers of the revolution in 2011, has not yet 
been addressed successfully. in addition the wave of protests that hit the Kasserine 
region and the surrounding areas in the south in January 2016 was a warning of the 
potential for crisis that still exists in significant portions of the Tunisian territory.
in addition, since 2015 the country has experienced a growing terrorist threat,7 which 
has put pressure on the Tunisian political system and its economy, as tourism has been 
hit hard, worsening an already bleak economic picture. These attacks have shed light 
on the existence of radical islamism in Tunisia, a fact that the post-arab Spring Tunisian 
authorities had known about but were reluctant to address openly. in 2014 Tunisian 
fighters made up the single biggest national group among islamic State (iS) foreign 
fighters in Syria and iraq—as many as 3000 as of the end of 2014—and Tunisian press 
reports at that time suggested that about 9000 Tunisians were ready to join iS (Cristiani 
2014). under increasing armed pressure from the international coalition, iS started to 
send some of these militants to Libya. The presence of iS militants in Libya increased 
the risks for Tunisia significantly, and indeed a rise in the number of terrorist attacks on 
Tunisian soil was one of the outcomes of this dynamic. Thus, the picture for Tunisia in 
the first five years after the arab Spring has been mixed. on the one hand, the country 
has made a genuine attempt to pluralise and democratise its institutions, and all the 
political actors in the system have managed to keep the political struggle, with some 
exceptions, within the limits of the democratic game and dialectics. in this context, the 
election of the islamic Ennahda party in 2011 and its defeat in 2014—with acceptance 
of the ballot’s results and the party’s continuous evolution as a democratic actor (Ghan-
nouchi 2016)—and the resilience of Tunisian institutions despite the terrorist threat are 
proof that this process is robust. on the other hand, there is the menace of terrorism: a 
radical and revolutionary islamist culture, with many youngsters, particularly from the 
south, willing to join iS; unaddressed regional dualism and economic problems; and the 
persistent temptation from a number of secularist actors to exclude islamist parties tout 
court from the political system continue to pose serious threats to the wider stability of 
the Tunisian path to consolidation.
Avoiding marginalisation
To start with, the algerian experience suggests that political and social marginalisation 
often causes a reaction. This was the case for many social groups in algeria at the time 
of the one-party system, and was even more the case when those political groups were 
barred from power after they had won elections. Such a reaction can provoke a violent 
downward spiral which may contribute to securitising and militarising the confrontation. 
indeed, at that time FiS was not obviously a radical organisation, and the militarisation 
7 in 2015, Tunisia suffered three major terrorist attacks: the Bardo attack in March, the Sousse attack in 
June, and lastly, the suicide bombing of a presidential guard bus in Tunis, in the area of Lac i, at the end of 
november.
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of the confrontation contributed to triggering a fully fledged civil war that lasted for 
almost 10 years. For Tunisia, it is even more important to avoid the militarisation of this 
issue, as, in contrast to algeria, the government lacks the military strength and security 
capabilities to fight such a war. This does not mean that terrorism and radicalism should 
be tackled only with non-military tools: the Tunisian authorities must also address this 
issue from that point of view, but always within the limits of the rule of law and propor-
tionality, and by accompanying any such actions with social and economic measures to 
address the grievances that nurture radicalism.
avoiding marginalisation does not mean accepting and including all political groups or 
ideologies. it only implies rejection of the impulse, still present in certain ultra-secularist 
sections of Tunisian society—particularly in Tunis—to consider all islamist groups as 
the same. This goes hand in hand with avoiding losing the support of and alienating 
the conservative middle class. while it is true that youngsters often fuel radicalism, 
their beliefs can be somewhat moderated by the presence of groups of older people 
who are political and social protagonists. The latter represent cultural and social buffers 
against the spread of radicalism, particularly in those societies and local communities 
in which family links still matter. The algerian response to the rise of islamist political 
parties alienated most traditional constituencies and, because some parties were also 
considered enemies by the more radical groups who fought in the civil war, they lost 
their capacity to influence the silent mass of young people targeted by radical islamist 
propaganda.
Global jihad, the radicalisation of discontent 
and the erosion of traditional social buffers
again referring to the algerian experience, there is another important point to underline. 
it is not a coincidence that the emergence of the algerian crisis that paved the way to 
civil war happened at the end of the 1980s, a decade in which the global, radical islamist 
movement changed considerably. This decade was central to the radicalisation and, 
to some degree, the emergence of the more revolutionary character of these groups. 
Beginning in the early 1990s the global Salafi–wahhabi movement, from which first al-
Qaeda and later iS emerged, morphed into a revolutionary movement and turned its 
sights against the Saudi regime that had originally started to promote this ideology in 
the 1970s in a politically passive form (Gause iii 2016, 119). as the jihadist movement 
expanded globally in the 1980s, it enabled the spread of this ideology to areas that were 
historically far from the centre of its dissemination, particularly following the return of 
the so-called arab afghans to their home countries from afghanistan. Having spread, 
this revolutionary version of Salafism represented a potent tool for destabilisation in 
many areas. This was also the case in those countries in which central governments 
were known to take a rather robust approach to islamism, such as Tunisia under Ben 
ali. This dynamic thus created a local environment conducive to the radicalisation of 
many groups, particularly in rural and suburban areas, through the spread of an ideol-
ogy that was mostly alien to the local cultural environment. at the same time, the lack 
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of opportunities for other, less radical islamist organisations prevented the erection of a 
‘natural fence’ against the spread of this ideology.
From this point of view, another lesson that Tunisia can draw from the algerian expe-
rience is that rediscovering and strengthening local, traditional identities can create a 
cultural barrier against the spread of alien, radical ideologies, and that the presence of 
islamist political players can also stop militant proselytism. Thus, there is the risk that 
the rising wave of terrorism that has hit Tunisia could tempt certain secular groups to 
use it as a tool in rhetoric against all islamist players. it is always important to differenti-
ate, and the FiS experience is telling from this point of view, as disbanding moderate 
islamist organisations could pave the way for the emergence of more radical groups.
in this respect, the need to promote more efficient policies to reduce the regional 
dualism that still characterises Tunisia must also be considered: marginalisation was 
crucial in prompting the october riots in algeria in 1988. it was also one of the reasons 
why radicalism emerged in rural Tunisia, and regional dualism was one of the key trig-
gers of the arab Spring, which did indeed start in the Tunisian interior’s underdeveloped 
areas. addressing this dualism would also serve the aim of removing the structural con-
ditions that underlie the spread of radicalism, which is ultimately a key risk for the future 
of Tunisian democracy.
Last, but not least, the algerian experience shows that without reconciliation, it is 
impossible to move forward. This option should be considered in a cautious manner, 
for instance when dealing with groups and militants who persist in refusing to accept 
pluralism and tolerance. But reconciliation should be used to welcome back into Tuni-
sian society those people who show a genuine change and to demonstrate the inclusive 
nature of a pluralistic regime.
Conclusion
The algerian experience during the 1990s shows that the emergence of radical islamist 
terrorism can become a systemic threat which has the potential to put the structure of 
the state at risk and to inflict political, social and psychological wounds that are particu-
larly complicated, if not impossible, to heal. although the countries of the Maghreb are 
all very different, despite being part of the same geographical area, it is still possible to 
draw certain comparisons and to isolate factors and dynamics that represent either a 
model of inspiration or mistakes to avoid. Tunisia was the country that started this wave 
of change, and so far it is the only one which has moved forward, despite a number of 
problems. The problems algeria experienced after the opening up of its authoritarian 
and single-party system—that is, the subsequent emergence of radical islamist move-
ments and the eruption of terrorism—help us understand the challenges that, if not met, 
can undermine and derail the path towards the consolidation of pluralism, and thus 
democracy, in Tunisia.
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The disruption of the democratic and pluralist process in algeria opened up the 
chasm of civil war. while Tunisia does not seem to be taking the same path, the risks 
of a reverse wave are still significant. The country must avoid making the same mis-
takes that halted the democratic process in algeria and radicalised some of its domestic 
constituencies.
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